New Page 5

News Bulletin Achieves Since 2006
Click Here to go to the LCCC Daily English/Arabic News Buletins Archieves Since 2006

Bible Quotation For Today/None of those who were invited will taste my dinner.
Luke 14/16-24: "Then Jesus said to him, ‘Someone gave a great dinner and invited many. At the time for the dinner he sent his slave to say to those who had been invited, "Come; for everything is ready now. "But they all alike began to make excuses. The first said to him, "I have bought a piece of land, and I must go out and see it; please accept my apologies. "Another said, "I have bought five yoke of oxen, and I am going to try them out; please accept my apologies."Another said, "I have just been married, and therefore I cannot come. "So the slave returned and reported this to his master. Then the owner of the house became angry and said to his slave, "Go out at once into the streets and lanes of the town and bring in the poor, the crippled, the blind, and the lame. "And the slave said, "Sir, what you ordered has been done, and there is still room. "Then the master said to the slave, "Go out into the roads and lanes, and compel people to come in, so that my house may be filled.For I tell you, none of those who were invited will taste my dinner."

Bible Quotation For Today/See what love the Father has given us, that we should be called children of God; and that is what we are
First Letter of John 03/01-10: "See what love the Father has given us, that we should be called children of God; and that is what we are. The reason the world does not know us is that it did not know him.Beloved, we are God’s children now; what we will be has not yet been revealed. What we do know is this: when he is revealed, we will be like him, for we will see him as he is.And all who have this hope in him purify themselves, just as he is pure. Everyone who commits sin is guilty of lawlessness; sin is lawlessness. You know that he was revealed to take away sins, and in him there is no sin. No one who abides in him sins; no one who sins has either seen him or known him. Little children, let no one deceive you. Everyone who does what is right is righteous, just as he is righteous. Everyone who commits sin is a child of the devil; for the devil has been sinning from the beginning. The Son of God was revealed for this purpose, to destroy the works of the devil. Those who have been born of God do not sin, because God’s seed abides in them; they cannot sin, because they have been born of God. The children of God and the children of the devil are revealed in this way: all who do not do what is right are not from God, nor are those who do not love their brothers and sisters."

LCCC Latest analysis, editorials from miscellaneous sources published on August 20-21/15
Why the AKP supports Erdogan’s gamble/Manuel Almeida/Al Arabiya/August 20/15
Why Salafists in Lebanon have become disempowered/Geneive Abdo/Al Arabiya/August 20/15
Is Zabadani’s land swap a prelude to partitioning Syria/Mohamed Chebarro/Al Arabiya/August 20/15
What's Behind Trudeau's Secret Mosque Visit/Tarek Fatah/The Toronto Sun/August 20/15
If Tehran Turns Down the Nuclear Deal/Daniel Pipes/Washington Times/August 20/15
No Room for Improvement /Robert Satloff/American Interest/Wasjington Institute/August 20/15
Iranian Moderates Face Tall Obstacles in 2016 Elections/Mehdi Khalaji/Washington Institute/August 20/15
Saudi Arabia to West: Improve Your Human Rights Record/Raymond Ibrahim/FrontPage Magazine/August 20/15
Election Time in Turkey: Tossing the Dice Again/Burak Bekdil/Gatestone Institute/August 20/15
Nuke Deal or Not, Iran Has Already Declared War on Us/Lawrence A. Franklin/Gatestone Institute.org/August 20/15
Chief Palestinian Negotiator Saeb Erekat's Positions On Israel Show Increasing Radicalization/MEMRI/August 20/15
Critical Points To Consider In Understanding The Iranian Nuclear Deal: Part III/By: Y. Carmon, and A. Braunstein/MEMRI/August 20/15

LCCC Bulletin titles for the Lebanese Related News published on August 20-21/15
How Miserable we the Maronites are/Elias Bejjani
Israel Strikes Syria in Response to Rocket Fire in the North
IDF: At Least Four Rockets Fired at Northern Israel Likely From Syria
LCCC Bulletin Miscellaneous Reports And News published on August 19-20/15
The four rockets fired on Galilee came from the new Iranian terror front on the Golan
Ibrahim after Talks with Aoun: Door is not Shut
Report: Talks with IS over Hostages Resume after Six Months Freeze
Loyalty to Resistance Urges Mustaqbal to Stop 'Evading' Dialogue with FPM

LCCC Bulletin Miscellaneous Reports And News published on August 20-21/15
North and South Korea Trade Artillery Fire as Tensions Soar
Turkey Must do More to Fight IS, Says Pentagon Chief
Iraq Could Face 'Partition' without Reform, Says Top Shiite Cleric
Palestinian Hunger Striker: From Obscurity to Symbol of Resistance
George W. Bush Pitches in for Jeb as 2016 Heats up

How Miserable we the Maronites are
Elias Bejjani/20/15/The blind all who walks behind a blind like him both fall in each and every hole they encounter. Accordingly what hopes do we the Maronites long from the majority of our blind leaders? What hope are wisely expected from the conceited Al Raei whose focus is merely on earthly matters and whose stances are totally Lukewarm, neither hot nor cold. What hopes do we expect from the derailed Micheal Aoun, the anti Christ in all that he does and utter? definite disasters from such leaders are the harvests!!

Israel Strikes Syria in Response to Rocket Fire in the North
Haaretz/Gili Cohen and Jack Khoury Aug 20, 2015/The Israeli army responded with artillery fire after rockets fired from Syria exploded in Israel's north on Thursday, while the Israel Air Force also struck Syria in response. At least four rockets were fired at the northern Galilee and Golan Heights on Thursday afternoon, the Israel Defense Forces said. The rocket attack, which the IDF characterized as "deliberate and orchestrated," resulted in no casualties. Two explosion sites were identified in the northern Galilee, and two in the Golan Heights. No damage or injuries were reported.The IDF Spokesman said in a statement that "the army sees Syria as responsible for the fire, and it will pay the price for it."The rockets were likely fired from territory area under the control of Syrian President Bashar Assad's regime. The Syrian government only controls the area around the village of Khader near the border with Israel, but deeper inside the Syrian Golan Heights there are additional areas under the Assad regime's control. The IDF also said that Islamic Jihad fired the rockets "with Iranian funding and direction." Palestinian administrative detainee Mohammed Allaan, who recently lost consciousness and suffered irreparable brain damage due to his prolonged hunger strike, was a member of the Islamic Jihad. The IDF has responded in the past to incidents they see as "crossing a red line," or direct attacks on Israel. In the past, the Israeli army has attacked targets belonging to the Syrian Army in response to firing at Israel on the Golan Heights. The defense establishment considers such attacks on the Golan as terrorist attacks, with Iran being behind them. The IDF notes there are a number of groups operating on the Syrian side of the border Samir Kuntar's militia and that of Mustafa Mughniyeh, the brother of Jihad Mughniyeh who was killed in January in an attack attributed to Israel; as well as local Palestinian groups.

IDF: At Least Four Rockets Fired at Northern Israel Likely From Syria
Haaretz/August 20/15/At least four rockets were fired at the northern Galilee on Thursday afternoon, the Israel Defense Forces said. An unconfirmed number of the projectiles exploded in the north after sirens sounded in several towns on the Israel-Lebanon border.
The IDF said that the rockets were likely fired from Syria. The rockets probably came from an area under the control of Syrian President Bashar Assad's regime. The Syrian government only controls the area around the village of Khader near the border with Israel, but deeper inside the Syrian Golan Heights there are additional areas under the Assad regime's control. There were no reports of damage or injuries, but there were brush fires at the scene. Residents were instructed to stay in their homes for ten minutes.Earlier, sirens sounded in several towns on the Israel-Lebanon border, including Gonen, Kfar Bloom, Lehavot HaBashan, Kfar Szold.

The four rockets fired on Galilee came from the new Iranian terror front on the Golan
DEBKAfile Exclusive Report August 20, 2015/Israel’s top government and military went on a high level of preparedness Tuesday, Aug. 18 in expectation of the first terrorist attack to be orchestrated by Iran from Syrian or Lebanese borders. That is what brought Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon and Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gady Eisenkott on a tour of inspection to the Golan and Northern Command headquarters. Netanyahu said then that Israel is ready for any scenario and would “harm anyone trying to harm us.”debkafile’s military sources report that these events were sparked by the knowledge reaching Israeli intelligence that Iranian Al Qods and Hizballah officers were building a new terrorist network for mounting large-scale terrorist attacks on Israel from the Syrian border opposite the Golan. The officers had handed out anti-tank and anti-air rockets to the terrorists, raising Israeli suspicions that one of their plans was to seize an Israeli location or part of one and try and hold out against an Israeli counter-offensive of tanks and assault helicopters. Our counter-terrorism sources disclose that three radical terrorist movements staff the new network: One is the hard-line rejectionist Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC). Another is the Golan-based Syrian Druze group known as Liberators of the Golan. It is headed by the notorious Samir Kuntar, a Lebanese Druze who has set up a Golan terror ring based in the Druze village of Al-Khadar opposite the Israeli border fence. Also harnessed to Iran’s new Golan terror organization is the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) which is made up of radical Christian terrorists. This old timer violent group, which is run by Syrian intelligence, took part in the 1982-3 Hizballah bombing massacres at the US Embassy and Marine headquarters in Beirut. The first SSNP activists have arrived in the Quneitra district of the Golan. According to our military sources, it is this Iranian-backed network which Thursday, Aug. 20, fired a salvo of four rockets from the Golan into upper Galilee and the Golan. The impact set off brush fires but caused no casualties. A red alert had sent most people running to shelters. This was an unusually long-range attack: Previous launches from within Syria, whether deliberate or stray fire from the civil war there, hit the Israeli-held Golan without reaching the Israeli interior. It is now up to Israel to decide how and when to respond to an act of war orchestrated by Tehran, after the prime minister’s warning Tuesday had no deterrent effect.

Ibrahim after Talks with Aoun: Door is not Shut
Naharnet/August 20/15/ General Security chief Maj. Gen. Abbas Ibrahim has said that he discussed with Free Patriotic Movement chief MP Michel Aoun ways to resolve the cabinet crisis.“The door is not closed. There is a possibility to find a solution,” Ibrahim told al-Joumhouria newspaper published on Thursday.Ibrahim denied that he discussed with Aoun on Wednesday a certain proposal, saying “we are discussing all ideas and all possibilities.”He stressed that he hasn't stopped from holding contacts with other officials to end the current crisis, which erupted when FPM officials said they would not approve any decision in the cabinet if ministers do not first agree on its decision-making mechanism. The FPM has been holding anti-government protests to pressure Prime Minister Tammam Salam into amending the mechanism that was adopted as a result of the vacuum at the presidential palace. The movement's ministers want to have a say in setting the cabinet agenda, claiming they represent the Christian president in his absence.The FPM also rejects the extension of the terms of high-ranking military and security officials, calling for the appointment of new officers because Aoun wants his son-in-law Brig. Gen. Chamel Roukoz, who is the Commando Regiment chief, to become army chief. His demands have led to the paralysis of the executive body, which failed to convene this week. Ibrahim has launched an initiative to raise the retirement age of senior army officers for three years to end the growing political crisis.Al-Joumhouria said that Speaker Nabih Berri, the head of al-Mustaqbal parliamentary bloc MP Fouad Saniora and Progressive Socialist Party chief lawmaker Walid Jumblat also held a meeting on Monday to discuss ways to activate the cabinet's work.

Report: Talks with IS over Hostages Resume after Six Months Freeze
Naharnet/August 20/15/Negotiations between General Security chief Maj. Gen. Abbas Ibrahim and the Islamic State extremist group have resumed to reach a deal on the release of the captive servicemen, al-Joumhouria newspaper reported Thursday. The daily said the talks resumed around two weeks ago through a mediator after more than six months of freeze in the negotiations aimed at agreeing on a prisoner swap. Ibrahim is waiting for the mediator's return from abroad to hear an answer on his demands from the IS, al-Joumhouria added. The report came after the relatives of the servicemen abducted by extremists in August 2014 failed for the second time in four days to meet with their loved ones. The families were scheduled to meet with the hostages held by the IS on Saturday and Tuesday on the outskirts of the northeastern border town of Arsal.But they failed to do so due to reasons linked to the IS. A number of soldiers and policemen were kidnapped by al-Nusra Front and IS gunmen in the wake of clashes in Arsal. A few of them have since been released, four were executed, and the rest remain held. Among the demands of the captors are the release of Islamists held in Lebanon.

Report: Agreement on Bassil to Head FPM as Alain Aoun Expresses Dismay in Electoral Process
Naharnet/August 20/15/The Free Patriotic Movement reached an agreement on Thursday for Jebran Bassil to be elected as its president, reported MTV. Bassil, who is also the country's foreign minister, will succeed his father-in-law MP Michel Aoun as chief of the FPM.
Aoun will meanwhile select the vice presidents of the party, revealed LBCI television. The elections were held during an extraordinary meeting for the FPM. Aoun declared before the movement's members: “The agreement over the elections was based on the will of the majority.”“I bless this decision and encourage it,” he added, while hoping that the members will be loyal to each other. After the announcement, MP Alain Aoun, who was running in the election, issued a statement, saying: “I was seeking in this race to present my vision of the leadership of the movement for the upcoming phase.” “I sought to present what I thought was best and most appropriate for the FPM based on the experience of the past ten years and what challenges we may expect in the future,” he added. “Ever since the launch of the electoral campaign however, matters have veered off their desired course and it emerged that the necessary conditions to protect the democratic elections were lacking, which is a dangerous omen of division that may threaten the unity of the FPM in the post-elections stage,” added the lawmaker. “Based on MP Michel Aoun's wishes, my constant confidence in him, and my awareness of the impact on the unity of the FPM, given the major political pressure it is under, I urge on all to overcome this phase and continue on working together for the interest and future of the movement,” he concluded.

Loyalty to Resistance Urges Mustaqbal to Stop 'Evading' Dialogue with FPM
Naharnet/August 20/15/Hizbullah's Loyalty to the Resistance bloc voiced on Thursday its support for efforts that seek to protect the government, while renewing its accusation against the Mustaqbal Movement of standing behind the country's ongoing political deadlock.
It said after its weekly meeting: “We urge the Mustaqbal party to cease evading holding dialogue with Free Patriotic Movement chief MP Michel Aoun.”It declared that the Mustaqbal Movement's stance is delaying resolving pending political disputes and creating new problems in Lebanon, such as the waste disposal crisis and the dispute over the wages of public sector employees. “The deliberate isolation directed against the FPM by rival parties will backfire against them,” stressed the Loyalty to the Resistance bloc in a statement read by MP Hassan Fadlallah. Moreover, the bloc stated: “Respecting the National Pact and constitution is key to resolving the political deadlock in Lebanon.”The bloc also hailed the arrest of cleric Ahmed al-Asir on Saturday, hoping that justice would take its course in the case and that his accomplices will be detained. The Salafist cleric was apprehended at Beirut's Rafik Hariri International Airport as he attempted to escape to Nigeria via Egypt. The firebrand anti-Hizbullah figure is wanted, among other charges, for his involvement in clashes between his supporters and the army in the southern city of Sidon's Abra region in 2013.

North and South Korea Trade Artillery Fire as Tensions Soar
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/August 20/15/South and North Korea traded artillery fire across their heavily militarized border on Thursday, in a rare exchange that left no casualties but pushed already elevated cross-border tensions to dangerously high levels. North Korea followed up with an ultimatum sent via military hotline that gave the South 48 hours to dismantle loudspeakers blasting propaganda messages across the border or face further military action. The South's defense ministry dismissed the threat and said the broadcasts would continue. Direct exchanges of fire across the inter-Korean land border are extremely rare, mainly, analysts say, because both sides recognize the risk for a sudden and potentially disastrous escalation between two countries that technically remain at war. Thursday's incident came amid heightened tensions following mine blasts that maimed two members of a South Korean border patrol earlier this month and the launch this week of a major South Korea-US military exercise that infuriated Pyongyang. In a detailed press briefing later in the day, the South's defense ministry said the nuclear-armed North initially fired a single artillery round over the border shortly before 4:00pm (0700 GMT). Minutes later it fired several more in the rough direction of one of the South's loudspeaker units, but the shells fell short on the South's side of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) -- a four kilometer-wide buffer area straddling the actual frontier line. The South Korean military retaliated by firing "dozens of rounds of 155mm shells" which the ministry said were also aimed to land in the North's section of the DMZ. As a preventive measure, local South Korean residents in Yeoncheon county some 60 kilometers north of Seoul were ordered to evacuate their homes for nearby shelters. South Korean troops were placed on maximum alert, while President Park Geun-Hye chaired an emergency meeting of her National Security Council and ordered a "stern response" to any further provocations. Later in the day, North Korea convened an emergency meeting of its powerful Central Military Commission, South Korean news agency Yonhap reported the North's state media as saying. The U.S. state department also warned against "provocative actions" from North Korea, in comments carried by Yonhap. "Such provocative actions heighten tensions, and we call on Pyongyang to refrain from actions and rhetoric that threaten regional peace and security," State Department spokesperson Katina Adams said of North Korea's shelling of the South. "The United States remains steadfast in its commitments to the defense and its allies, and will continue to coordinate closely with the Republic of Korea," the news agency quoted her as saying. Dan Pinkston, Korea expert at the International Crisis Group in Seoul, said the situation left both sides locked in a dangerous standoff. The North's decision to lob shells over the border was surprising, "because the inherent risks are just so big", Pinkston said. "If they had hit something strategic or caused any casualties, the South's response would have been far stronger, and then suddenly we're on the path towards a serious confrontation," he added. The incident fuelled tensions that have been on high simmer in recent weeks following the border landmine incident. Seoul said the mines were placed by North Korea and responded by resuming high-decibel propaganda broadcasts across the border, using loudspeakers that had lain silent for more than a decade. The North denied any role and threatened "indiscriminate" shelling of the loudspeaker units. It also vowed retaliatory strikes after Seoul and Washington refused to call off their annual Ulchi Freedom military drill, which kicked off Monday and roleplays responses to a full-scale North Korean invasion. Pyongyang regularly ups its bellicose rhetoric before and during the annual joint exercises, but rarely follows through on its threats. In the past, its default response has been to test fire missiles into the East Sea (Sea of Japan).
The last direct attack on the South was in November 2010 when North Korea shelled the South Korean border island of Yeonpyeong, killing two civilians and two soldiers. On that occasion, South Korea responded by shelling North Korean positions, triggering brief fears of a full-scale conflict. In October last year, North Korea border guards attempted to shoot down some helium balloons launched across the land border by activists and carrying thousands of anti-North leaflets.The incident triggered a brief exchange of heavy machine-gun fire and scuppered a planned resumption of high-level talks.

Turkey Must do More to Fight IS, Says Pentagon Chief
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/August 20/15/Turkey should play a full part in the U.S.-led air campaign against the Islamic State group and take better control of its border with Syria, the U.S. defense secretary said Thursday. Pentagon chief Ashton Carter said Turkey had agreed in principle to join the anti-IS coalition but should now add its own warplanes to the "air tasking order," the military structure coordinating strikes. "They need to join the ATO and they need to work more on controlling their border. And we've made that clear," he told reporters. "Their leadership has indicated that this needs to be done. It's overdue, because it's a year into the campaign, but they're indicating some considerable effort now." Turkey agreed last month to step up its involvement in the war raging across its southern border in Syria and to allow U.S. planes to launch strikes from a Turkish base. But its involvement in the battle against the IS group has so far been limited and it appears to be concentrating on its recently revived war with Kurdish separatist militants.
Carter said the Islamic State group is still able to bring fighters and supplies over the Turkish border and into Syria. "We need them also as a neighbor to this conflict zone, as a long-time NATO ally and a responsible member of the anti-ISIL coalition, to control the border," he said. "I don't think they're dragging their feet," Carter said, adding that allowing US strikes to be launched from Turkish air fields was "important, but not enough."

Iraq Could Face 'Partition' without Reform, Says Top Shiite Cleric
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/August 20/15/Iraq's top Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, warned on Thursday that the country faces dire consequences including possible "partition" if real reform is not carried out. Sistani, who is revered by millions, has made multiple calls for reform measures this month that have helped spur a wide-ranging anti-corruption drive by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. "Today, if true reform is not realized by fighting corruption without mercy and realizing social justice on different levels, it is expected that circumstances will become worse than before," Sistani said in a written statement from his office in response to questions from AFP. Iraq could be "dragged to... partition and the like, God forbid," he said. It was Sistani's most direct warning yet on the possible consequences if reforms he has advocated are not carried out. Corruption in Iraq has already cost the country dearly in the war against the Islamic State jihadist group, which overran around a third of the country last year, Sistani said. Without rampant corruption, especially in the security forces, and abuse of power by top officials, "the Daesh terrorist organization would not have been able to control a large part of the territory of Iraq," he said, using an Arabic acronym for the jihadist group. Amid a major heatwave that has seen temperatures top 50 degrees Celsius (120 degrees Fahrenheit), protesters have railed against the poor quality of services, especially power outages that leave just a few hours of government-supplied electricity per day. Thousands of people have turned out in Baghdad and cities in the Shiite south to vent their anger and pressure the authorities to make changes. Their demands were given a boost when Sistani called on August 7 for Abadi to take "drastic measures" against corruption, saying the "minor steps" he had announced fell short. The following Friday, Sistani said judicial reforms were needed, and Abadi responded by calling on the judiciary to carry out measures to ensure its independence and allow it to fight corruption. Calls for change by Sistani have shielded as well as influenced Abadi's efforts, as it is politically risky for rival Shiite politicians to publicly oppose measures called for by the top cleric. But even with popular support and Sistani's backing, the entrenched nature of corruption and the fact parties across the political spectrum benefit from it will make any efforts extremely difficult.

Palestinian Hunger Striker: From Obscurity to Symbol of Resistance
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/August 20/15/When Mohammed Allan's friends found out he was launching a hunger strike, they knew his stubbornness meant he would not give up easily. "We knew he would go until the end with it," Odai Alaweyeh told AFP of the 31-year-old Palestinian lawyer said to be a member of militant movement Islamic Jihad. "He is the kind of person who, if he believes in an idea or cause, he goes until the end."Allan finally ended his hunger strike on Thursday after beginning it on June 18 to protest his detainment without trial by Israel. His decision to stop fasting came after Israel's High Court suspended his detention -- and after he had twice been in a coma. The court ruled that he must remain in hospital, but left open the question of what would happen if or when his health improved.He was bedridden Thursday, but conscious and being given vitamins and minerals intravenously. Allan has been held since November in what is known as administrative detention, which allows internment without charge or trial for six-month intervals that can be renewed indefinitely. Palestinian authorities say Israel has offered to release Allan in November, at the end of his second six-month interval, but activists have continued to push for immediate freedom. Around 340 Palestinians are now held in administrative detention, according to Israeli authorities, and detainees have regularly gone on hunger strike to protest. From Einabus near Nablus in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, Allan was little known only several weeks ago. But his thickly bearded face has recently become something of a new symbol of Palestinian resistance, with his photo posted on social networks and branded on posters supporting his cause, not to mention being published by newspapers and television stations. For Israeli authorities, before his arrest in November he "was in contact with an Islamic Jihad terrorist" with the aim of carrying out large-scale attacks. He was previously imprisoned from 2006 to 2009 for allegedly seeking to recruit suicide bombers and assisting wanted Palestinians, according to Israeli domestic security agency Shin Bet. His lawyers say he was never informed of the accusations against him during his recent detainment, and his friend Alaweyeh described him as "religious, but not radical". "He is stubborn, but he is a good and straightforward man," he said.
Friends said he practiced criminal defense law and took on civil cases. He has also become a cause for rightwing Israelis, but for different reasons. They have argued strongly against his release, criticizing judges for giving in to what they see as "blackmail".Some have pushed for him to be force-fed under a controversial law passed last month that allows for the practice in certain circumstances. Public Security Minister Gilad Erdan said Wednesday that Allan's release "would constitute a reward for his hunger strike and could encourage mass hunger strikes among security detainees".

George W. Bush Pitches in for Jeb as 2016 Heats up
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/August 20/15/Jeb Bush might be his own man, but he showed Thursday he won't hesitate to enlist his brother George, the former president, in his own bid to win the White House in 2016.George W. Bush wrote a fundraising email in support of his younger brother, who is locked in a tough race for the Republican nomination and is trailing bombastic frontrunner Donald Trump in poll after poll. "I rarely send emails like this, but I wanted to make sure I asked for your support on behalf of my brother, Jeb," George W. Bush wrote in the first campaign message of its kind by the 43rd president. "This is a consequential time in our nation's history, and we need a strong leader," he added. "Jeb took on tough challenges as Florida's governor and delivered results. I know he will do the same as president. George W. Bush remains deeply divisive in the United States, where many argue that his Iraq invasion was among the worst foreign policy blunders in U.S. history. While Jeb has insisted that "I am my own man," he has struggled to emerge from his brother's shadow. He was criticized by presidential rivals recently for enlisting several advisers who worked for George W. Bush. The email hit inboxes as a new Quinnipiac University poll showed Jeb trailing "The Donald," as he is nicknamed, in three key swing states: Ohio, Pennsylvania and Bush's home turf of Florida. It landed just as Bush began showing backbone against relentless rhetoric by Trump, who on Wednesday hammered Bush for his Iraq and immigration policies and ridiculed his deflated poll numbers.
"He's going down like a rock," Trump told a raucous, overflowing crowd in New Hampshire, which holds the first-in-the-nation primary. "I don't see how he's electable," Trump taunted, as Bush spoke just miles away at his own New Hampshire town hall.
"You know what's happening to Jeb's crowd, right down the street? They're sleeping!" Trump boomed. Bush returned fire from his stage, saying "Mr. Trump doesn't have a proven conservative record" and "was a Democrat longer in the last decade than he was a Republican."He continued the pushback Thursday, blasting Trump's "tidal wave of accusations or bombastic talk" on immigration. Trump has unveiled an immigration plan that includes building a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border, and rounding up and deporting millions of undocumented immigrants. "This whole immigration debate is hurtful for a lot of people, really hurtful," Bush told reporters Thursday. "There's a lot of people that share the immigrant experience, and what they hear is 'You don't think I'm part of this, part of this country.'"
Bush bristled when asked whether it was appropriate to insist he is his own man, yet enlist brother George's help in his campaign. "Is that a contradiction?" Bush responded, visibly agitated. "I have my own record, my own life experience," he added. "I'm blessed to have a brother that loves me and wants to help me. Over and out."

Why the AKP supports Erdogan’s gamble
Manuel Almeida/Al Arabiya/Thursday, 20 August 2015/
Among Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s characteristics is the ability to issue provocative statements guaranteed to trigger the wrath of his political opponents. Yet last weekend in the Black Sea’s Rize province, the words of the President of Turkey and co-founder of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) struck a crucial nerve with the opposition: “Whether it is accepted or not, Turkey’s system of government has changed. What needs to be done now is to clarify and confirm the legal framework of this de facto situation with a new constitution.”Erdogan’s remarks about a de-facto presidential system may be a fairly accurate reflection of his first year in office, during which the president chaired cabinet meetings for the first time in the history of the AKP. But it was quite a blunt move to admit the rules that have governed the Turkish Republic will be shaped to suit his own ambitions. It was also an anticipated confirmation Erdogan’s long standing goal to transform the largely ceremonial presidential post into an executive one is at the distance of a new election, which could give the ruling AKP a renewed majority in parliament, or so the president hopes.
Stirring controversy
Most likely, Erdogan’s intention was to steer even more controversy days before the last attempts to form a coalition government, which if successful could work against his plans. As a senior government official told Reuters, Erdogan “is getting what he wants after a masterfully managed two months. It was clear since the beginning that in no way did he consider any other option than single AK Party rule.”The boldness of Erdogan’s comments is even more striking when considering Turkey is going through its worst period of instability in recent years.Opposition leaders reacted vigorously. Devlet Bahceli, leader of right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), said “we cannot tolerate a home-product Hitler, Stalin or Qaddafi. Turkey is bigger than one person.” Kemal Kilicdaroglu, leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), accused Erdogan of staging a coup the same way military officer and then President of Turkey, Kenan Evren, prepared the ground for the 1980 military coup he led by deposing Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel. On Monday, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu confirmed the failure of the talks with Bahceli to form a coalition government. This followed last week’s unsuccessful talks between the leaderships of the AKP and the CHP. Then on Tuesday evening, it was announced Davutoglu would hand over the mandate to form a new government back to Erdogan. According the constitution, if the prime minister is unable to form a government by August 23, the president has to dissolve the cabinet and call for the formation an interim power-sharing government until autumn’s election.
Period of instability
The boldness of Erdogan’s comments is even more striking when considering Turkey is going through its worst period of instability in recent years. To the political deadlock add the rising violence between the Turkish army and Kurdish militants and the ensuing collapse of the peace process with the Kurds, as well as the growing threat from ISIS now being bombed from Turkey’s Incirlik airbase. However, the president clearly believes this instability can play to his advantage. The logic is that at a time of great uncertainty, many voters will reconsider their choice in June’s election and recast their vote in the coming autumn election in favour of the AKP, the party that guided Turkey toward years of prosperity and stability via consecutive parliamentary majorities. There is also the hope among AKP ranks that the resumption of the conflict with the Kurds can affect the electoral results of pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP). In June’s election, the HDP won 13.1 percent of the vote, surpassing for the first time in its history the 10 percent election threshold and preventing the AKP from winning another majority. Given the potentially huge negative impact of Erdogan’s high risk bet, reliant on instability, uncertainty and polarization, do AKP’s high cadres remain united around the president’s strategy?
Divergences
The divergences in both style and substance between Erdogan and former president and co-founder of the AKP, Abdullah Gul, are well known and the latest episodes are only likely to deepen their differences. But despite his popularity among party cadres, Gul has largely kept away from the party’s spotlight. Nevertheless, various Turkish analysts believe there is growing discontent within the AKP about the impact the president’s personal ambitions have had on the party’s poor electoral result in June.
Earlier this year, the influential Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc made a series of public comments quite critical of Erdogan’s meddling in the government-led peace process with the Kurds and the polarizing effect of the president’s approach. Another possible sign of rifts within the AKP came in February this year, with the resignation of Turkey’s intelligence chief, Hakan Fidan. Erdogan reacted negatively to Fidan’s resignation, which was defended by Davutoglu. Fidan’s intention was to run for parliament, but he ended up withdrawing his resignation in March.
Nevertheless, the AKP seems the have closed its ranks in recent months, a move that the clout Erdogan wields helps to explain. Above all, a public split within the AKP at this point could be fatal for its ambitions in autumn’s election. At stake is nothing less than the AKP’s dominant position in Turkish politics, the lure of government jobs in a new cabinet, and the survival of the patronage network that grew around AKP’s hegemony in Turkey. However, it is far from guaranteed that the strategy of pushing for a new electoral round will bring the result Erdogan eagerly expects.

Why Salafists in Lebanon have become disempowered
Geneive Abdo/Al Arabiya/Thursday, 20 August 2015
Once considered rising political players in Lebanese politics, the Salafists who were active in aiding the Syrian rebels fighting President Bashar al-Assad’s regime are now in retreat.
After three years of monitoring their activities, a recent visit to their mosques and homes showed clearly that the weight and power of Hezbollah and its cooperation with the Lebanese intelligence and Armed Forces, and the changing dynamics in the Syrian war that have kept Assad in power, have all led to the Salafists’ decline.
The Salafists began to play a more public role in Lebanon after the Arab uprisings began. In 2012 and 2013, the Salafists in Lebanon, like many across the region, took unprecedented steps and entered the public debate to condemn Assad and Hezbollah’s atrocities in the war, which have left hundreds of thousands dead. In many countries in the region – with Egypt and Kuwait as the exceptions – Salafists were fiercely opposed to becoming involved in politics and believed it was against the practices of their faith. They focused primarily on dawa, encouraging other Muslims to follow their Islamic school of thought, which centers around promoting Islam as it was practiced during the first three generations of Muslims after the Prophet Mohammad’s death.
In Lebanon, some reluctantly became politically active because they believed aiding their Sunni Syrian brethren was an urgent cause. The days a few years ago when they preached impassioned sermons in their mosques against the Shiite, who they consider their enemy – so much so that two of their mosques were bombed during Friday prayers –- have ended. They have abandoned their short-lived desire to form a political party; they have ceased their activities that encouraged cross-border fighting with the Sunni rebels in Syria, and they realized that their diverse beliefs with Salafists in neighboring countries did not offer a coherent political agenda.
“Unfortunately, the activities among the Salafists in Lebanon had declined,” said Nabil Rahim a Salafist leader in the Tripoli area, who is on trial and accused of aiding extremists. “The reason is that people are occupied with their daily lives and the other is fear. We are afraid from the Lebanese security and, of course, from Hezbollah.”
Rahim also warned that the crackdown on the Salafists and other Sunni Islamists is leading young Sunni men to become more sympathetic with extremists, such as ISIS. “There was a video showing how the authorities treat Sunni Islamists in Lebanese jails and this is triggering young men to become violent. Some of them join radical groups due to their beliefs, but others are depressed and they feel this (extremism) is the best way to express themselves.”
Bilal Baroudi, another Salafist sheikh in the Tripoli area whose mosque was bombed in 2013 agrees that the weakness of Sunni political leadership is driving some Sunni activists to look elsewhere in a more radical direction. He also defended the Salafists’ past activism in aiding the Syrian opposition. “We helped the Syrian revolution but we never wanted to revolt against the Lebanese authorities,” he said.
A formidable force in Lebanese politics
Apparently, that message has not been understood by Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed Forces. Although there is a perception in the West that Hezbollah - which is militarily and financially stretched due to fighting in Syria to keep Assad in power - has lost influence, the party remains a formidable force in Lebanese politics. So much so, in fact, that Hezbollah has prevented a president from being elected because other political factions have opposed the party’s choice for the post.
The Salafists began to play a more public role in Lebanon after the Arab uprisings began, but particularly after the war in Syria turned into a conflict centered around Shiite and Sunni identity. In 2011, the Salafists provided shelter for Syrian refugees fleeing the war and entering northern Lebanon. This aid, combined with the absence of any significant Sunni political leadership in the Tripoli area as well as Beirut, allowed them to gain political support. The decisive turn in the Salafists’ fortune may have been the battle of Arsal in the Balbeek district, when some Salafists who were connected to extremist Sunni fighters, battled the Lebanese armed forces and Hezbollah. Salem Rafei, one Salafist who participated in the fighting in Arsal, showed this author the portion of his leg that had been shot off in the battle. Unlike in previous years, he seemed depressed and resigned to the turn in the Syrian war and the negative impact it has meant for the Salafists in Lebanon.
Lebanon’s Salafists had benefited from the rise of Salafist clerics in other countries who gave the anti-Shiite campaign all over the region credibility. The Salafists and their followers united over the belief that Hezbollah and Iran, by extension, aimed to become the dominant power in the region.
But the gains Lebanon’s Salafists received by being part of a transnational anti-Iran and anti-Shiite campaign could not withstand the force of Hezbollah and the Lebanese security forces that Hezbollah supports. One Salafist, Ahmed Assir, who confronted Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed Forces in June 2013, was arrested August 15, as he tried to leave the Beirut airport for Nigeria. Lebanon’s judiciary has accused him of involvement in the deaths of 17 Lebanese soldiers and sentenced him to death. Assir had become popular for speaking out against Hezbollah and demanding that the party disarm. His condemnation of Hezbollah in such a direct and confrontational manner was rare. During the confrontation in 2013, Assir’s volunteer fighters reportedly fired on an army checkpoint, killing soldiers and turning Sidon, the town where his mosque was located, into a battleground. The lesson that should be drawn from marginalizing the Salafists is that their activities might be curtailed, but there are unintended consequences. Their followers, not only in Lebanon but those who follow Salafists across the region, may turn to more radical Sunni groups. This does not serve the interests of Hezbollah or any other Shiite-led group in power.

Is Zabadani’s land swap a prelude to partitioning Syria?
Mohamed Chebarro/Al Arabiya/Thursday, 20 August 2015
Amidst the summer heat and the dust of battles and massacres across Syria, the search for a diplomatic solution is intensifying in the region. The Iranian nuclear deal with the West is felt in the Middle East and the renewed vigor in the search for conflict resolution is being interpreted as a result of the new deal. However, the question of the departure of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad remains elusive to all parties. Moscow, Tehran, Riyadh, and Geneva hosted many meetings between pro and anti-Assad groups searching to break the stalemate in Syria. I believe the international community must not accept or entertain a demographic or land transfer and stop flirting with and reject proposals tabled by Western policy makers that it is time in the Middle East to do away with the Sykes Picot lines in the sand
This furtive diplomatic search has overshadowed a new and alarming development, namely Zabadani and the battles to control the road between Damascus and Lebanon. Experts explain how the removal of opposition forces from the town and valley of Zabadani clears the way to establish an opposition free zone that extends along the Lebanese Syrian border. This is of course comes with the help of Hezbollah militias fighting to clear opposition fighters and people from all of the Qalamoun mountain range zigzagging along Lebanon’s eastern border with Syria.
A new chapter
The Zabadani valley battles seem to be opening up a new chapter in the Syrian conflict.
It is an operation designed to remove anti Assad inhabitants from the Zabadani valley and villages around it with the aim that opposition forces would then grant safe passage to forces loyal to Assad and the population of two enclaves of Foaa and Kefraya in north Idlib province. The swap would not be the first in conflicts around the world but its nature and who is playing the role of broker renders it interesting. It is reported that Iranian officers discussed with opposition leaders a deal to move Syrians, mainly Sunnis, from a strategic town close to Damascus. The area also includes Barada and Buqqin, two villages rich in water which play a part in controlling water supplies to the capital Damascus. Foaa and Kefraya in north western Idlib are in an enclave inhabited by the Shiite Syrian minority loyal to the Assad regime. The Iranian nuclear deal has focused all eyes in the West and the Middle East on the need to solve the problems in the region for any future dividends of the deal to start paying off. But President Assad is part of the problem and not the solution. He was the one who unleashed violence against the popular uprising. It is Assad who is said to have released from prison hundreds of violent Islamist extremists. It is Assad and his Iranian allies who seem to be designing the partitioning of Syria and the creation of sectarian enclaves, not the Syrian National opposition.
International failure
The international community failed to protect civilians during four years of aerial bombing by the regime not to mention the chemical and other internationally banned munitions used to kill Syrians.In the short term, the decision to partition Syria could serve the interests of Iran and Russia and ensure their foothold on the Mediterranean through a mini Alawite state ruled by the Assad dynasty. Such a state could strengthen bids made by Syrian Kurds to demand self-rule for a autonomous region regardless of the endgame arrived at with a United Syria or a carved up one. Right wing Israelis would be another party keen on seeing minority statelets or enclaves pop up, based on religious and or ethnic ground. This would justify calls made by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Likud government for Israel to be recognized as a Jewish state. In the short term, yes, dividing Syria could serve some interests of some parties for a short time. But I believe the international community must not accept or entertain a demographic or land transfer and stop flirting with and reject proposals tabled by Western policy makers that it is time in the Middle East to do away with the Sykes Picot lines in the sand drawn to carve the region up between France and Great Britain who defeated the Ottoman empire in the 20th century. In Syria, like elsewhere in the Middle East region, the stakes are high and many are right to start thinking outside the box, but it would be self-defeating for society and states to fight ISIS after setting the stage for a division of communities and land swaps. This would be to play straight into ISIS’ hands and all the enemies of moderate people in this region. Ridding Syria of Assad and ISIS will not succeed through land and people swaps in Zabadani or Kefraya or elsewhere.

What's Behind Trudeau's Secret Mosque Visit?
Tarek Fatah/The Toronto Sun/August 18, 2015
Originally published under the title, "Liberals Mum on Trudeau's Mosque Visit."
Recently, Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau met privately with a group of Islamic leaders inside a Regina mosque, an event from which the media were barred. The Liberal party is keeping a tight lid on what transpired during the two-hour, closed-door session last Tuesday. The gathering may well be one of the few election events of 2015 that will go unreported because as one correspondent assigned to cover the story told me: "Unfortunately I wasn't permitted inside."It seems almost every time Trudeau steps inside a mosque, he walks into a minefield of controversy. In March 2011 he visited a mosque in Montreal that a month later was classified by U.S. intelligence as an al-Qaida recruitment centre. Trudeau pleaded ignorance, arguing the mosque's link to al-Qaida came up only after he had visited it. In fact, as early as 2006, CBC's Radio Canada had done a lengthy investigative report on that mosque, identifying it as a well-known centre of radical anti-West rhetoric. What did Trudeau discuss with Islamic leaders behind closed doors at a Regina mosque? In 2013, Trudeau spent an evening at the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) Islamic centre west of Toronto during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. The parent organization of ISNA in the U.S. has been listed by the U.S. Justice Department as an "unindicted co-conspirator" in a terror funding trial. ISNA was never charged with any crime, but prosecutors listed it as one of the "entities who are and/or were members of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood". (A federal judge later ruled the document should not have been released and ISNA said its inclusion was guilt by association.)
The Regina mosque where Trudeau held his closed-door meeting last week "recommends" the ISNA website to its members on its web page.
A Liberal press release made no mention of the event. When I pressed for an explanation, a Liberal staffer in Ottawa called me saying it was not Liberal policy to make visits to religious institutions open to the media.
But that's not accurate. Trudeau has been photographed praying alongside Muslims in a Surrey mosque.
Next, I asked Liberal MP Ralph Goodale who had accompanied Trudeau, why the media was barred from the Regina mosque event. His answer was: "Media was present for coverage at door to mosque. Inside was regular evening prayer. Not our place to invite media."
But that does not match the account by Regina's Leader-Post newspaper. It said, "The Liberal leader arrived in Regina on Tuesday evening and headed to a south-end mosque where ... the media was not permitted to attend." The reporter, Nathan Liewicki, later told me, "A (Liberal) party spokesperson said Trudeau was going to be at the mosque and that the media were not able to attend."
Meanwhile, a spokesman for the mosque told me in an email Trudeau met with many members of the local Muslim community during his visit adding: "It was wrongly reported in the media that they were not allowed to attend. The coordinator from the Liberal party was asked to arrange for (a) media person if they wanted."
Contrast the Liberals' secrecy with Conservative Leader Stephen Harper's visit to a Hindu temple in Toronto on Monday. It was an open event with no restrictions on the media while the Liberal one was shrouded in secrecy.
**Trudeau owes an explanation to Canadians. What was discussed behind closed doors with Islamic leaders inside that mosque?
Tarek Fatah, a Robert J. and Abby B. Levine Fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a founder of the Muslim Canadian Congress, a columnist at the Toronto Sun, and the author of the award-winning books Chasing a Mirage: The Tragic Illusion of an Islamic State and The Jew is Not My Enemy: Unveiling the Myths that Fuel Muslim Anti-Semitism.

If Tehran Turns Down the Nuclear Deal
Daniel Pipes/Washington Times/August 20, 2015
Whether congressional Democrats accept or reject Barack Obama's Iran deal has great importance and is rightly the focus of international attention. But there's another debate taking place over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that may be even more critical: the one in Iran. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the country's decision maker, just might reject the laboriously worked-out agreement that he helped negotiate.
On one level, that makes no sense. As a plethora of analyses have established, the Vienna deal is enormously favorable to the Islamic Republic of Iran, legitimizing its nuclear research, assuring its future nuclear weapons program, helping the economy, and boosting its aggressive international goals. These advantages would make it appear absurd for Khamenei not to accept the deal. Plus, most Iranians celebrate the accord.
But rejecting it makes sense if one focuses not on those immediate advantages and instead looks at its future dangers to the Iranian regime's surviving. Leaders of fanatical and brutal government such as Khamenei's invariably make ideological purity and personal power their highest priorities and he is no exception. From this point of view – its impact on the regime's longevity – the deal contains two problems.
First, it betrays Ayatollah Khomeini's vision of unyielding enmity to the United States, a core principle that has guided the Islamic republic since he founded it in 1979. A substantial portion of the leadership, including Khamenei himself, hold to a purist vision that sees any relations with the United States as unacceptable and bordering on treachery. For this reason, Tehran has long been the world's only capital not seeking improved relations with Washington. These rejectionists disdain the benefits of the deal; they refuse it on grounds of principle.
Their position is hardly unique. Similarly, Palestinian rejectionists oppose treaties with Israel, regardless of their potential benefits, not wanting to truck with the enemy. (Think of the 1993 Oslo accords, which brought land, money, legitimacy, and guns.) Principle trumps practicality.
Second, Iranian opponents of the JCPOA worry about its eroding the Islamist values of Khomeini's revolution. They fear that the businessmen, tourists, students, artists, et al., perched soon to descend on an newly-opened Iran will further tempt the local population away from the difficult path of resistance and martyrdom in favor of consumerism, individualism, feminism, and multiculturalism. They despise and dread American clothing, music, videos, and education. Khamenei himself talks of the U.S. government seeking a way "to penetrate into the country." From their point of view, isolation and poverty have their virtues as means to keep the Iranian revolution alive.
In short, the Iranian debate over the deal is a genuine one, pitting those who argue in favor of the deal's short-term benefits against those fearful of its long-term dangers. Khamenei must make a difficult choice.
Back in the West, opponents of the deal will, of course, rejoice if Khamenei rejects the deal. But his doing so also presents them with a problem. After claiming that Obama has given away the store, they must confront the awkward fact that the Iranian leadership turned down his offer. As Obama emerges as an apparent hard-liner who protected American interests and out-bargained the bazaar merchants, their argument collapses. His accusation about their "making common cause" with the Iranian rejectionists will look newly convincing and terribly damning. Israel's prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu, currently in Obama's dog house, is especially at risk of being dismissed as foolish.
To avoid this fate, the deal's opponents must immediately prepare for the possibility of an Iranian "no."
That means their taking several steps: Pre-empt Khamenei by foreseeing and even predicting his rejection of the deal. Explain (as I have done here) that his reasons have nothing to do with its substance and everything with the purity of ideology and maintaining a revolutionary spirit. Develop a familiarity beyond the terms of the JCPOA and learn the intricacies of Iran's domestic scene. Hone anti-Obama arguments (such as: he deluded himself into thinking he had a negotiating partner when none existed). Devise a detailed policy toward Tehran that renews economic sanctions and enforces other penalties. Find allies internationally to help implement this renewed sanctions regime. Prepare the public for the possibility of destroying Iran's nuclear infrastructure.
Khamenei's rejection of the Vienna deal would be great news for everyone and especially for the deal's opponents – but the latter urgently need to prepare for this eventuality.

No Room for Improvement
Robert Satloff/American Interest/Wasjington Institute/August 19, 2015
There are several potential reasons why the Obama administration is still insisting that the nuclear deal is perfect as is, and most of them are deeply problematic.
Why has the Obama Administration -- in public, at least -- rejected all suggestions to improve the Iran nuclear agreement? Last week, I proposed five specific improvements to the Iran deal. These included ways to repair flaws in the process of penalizing Iran for possible violations; to raise the cost to Iran of transferring sanctions relief funds to terrorist proxies; and to strengthen deterrence so Iran thinks twice before exploiting sunset clauses in the deal to sprint toward a nuclear weapon at a later date. Every one of these suggestions could be achieved either by unilateral U.S. action or coordination with our European allies. In other words, I argued that the agreement can be substantially improved without reopening its contents for renegotiation.
I don't claim originality for these ideas. Many were included in two statements issued weeks ago by members of The Washington Institute's bipartisan Iran Study Group (see here and here). My contribution was to pull them together and present them as evidence that one does not have to believe in unicorns, as Secretary of State Kerry suggested, to believe there are legitimate ways to improve the Iran deal.
So far, however, the Obama Administration has doubled-down on the proposition that any improvement is a "fantasy." With less than a month to the congressional vote, and public skepticism about the agreement growing, there has been no public recognition that the President considers any improvements possible, let alone preferable.
On the face of it, this is understandable. After all, the White House does not need to win votes in either the House or the Senate; it merely needs to lose votes by less-than-landslide margins. With the yardstick for victory so low, success may come solely with solidifying core supporters. This was most likely the reason for the President's rouse-the-base, my-way-or-the-highway speech at American University.
But this approach doesn't really take account of the substantial number of senators and congressmen who remain uneasy about the deal, despite efforts by advocates to lock up "yes" votes as early as possible. For many of these still-undecideds, a comprehensive set of improvements would likely push them into the "approval" camp. Conversely, the more time that passes with the Administration circling the wagons and refusing to pursue sensible correctives, the more likely some will just say "no."
So, why hasn't the Administration taken any serious steps to address constructive critics of the agreement? In my view, there are seven possible reasons.
1. The Administration really does believe its own rhetoric. If this is the case, then, by definition, no critic can be constructive and no improvements are possible or necessary. Given the gravity of the issues, one has to hope that the Administration has not deluded itself into thinking it has achieved the diplomatic equivalent of the divine and immutable message Moses brought down from Mt. Sinai.
2. The Administration privately accepts the need for improvements but finds itself up a tree without a ladder. Having spent the month since the announcement of the Vienna accord arguing that improvements are fanciful, the White House may feel boxed in by its own rhetoric and fearful of the political fallout of admitting that fixes are both worthwhile and doable. The result is simply to wish the idea away. In this situation, political discretion sadly trumps strategic interest.
3. The Administration is concerned about spooking Iran. This theory holds that taking any additional measures now to bolster deterrence will be evidence to Iran of America's bad faith, triggering the unraveling of the entire agreement. This even extends to a presidential declaration to use "all means necessary" to prevent Iran's accumulation of highly enriched uranium, whose only practical use is for a nuclear weapon -- a declaration that would have no practical effect until 2030, when restrictions on enrichment and centrifuges expire. The problem with this is twofold: first, none of the proposed improvements violates any terms of the agreement, so the Administration would be holding itself to an unreachable standard of deference to Iranian sensibilities. Second, and more importantly, if the Administration restrains itself from bolstering deterrence against Iran now, before the deal has even gone into effect, this is a horrible sign of the deep reluctance it will have to take any effective measures in the months and years ahead. If this is the reason for Administration inaction, Iran really is in the driver's seat.
4. The Administration tried to reach understandings with the Europeans and failed. Two of the five proposals to improve the deal focus on fleshing out details of cooperation with our allies. These include a commonly agreed-upon set of punishments for various Iranian violations of the agreement and a commonly agreed-upon approach to penalizing Iran for transferring sanctions-relief funds to its terrorist proxies. In this scenario, the Administration has quietly tried to reach understandings with London, Paris and Berlin but has been rebuffed; eager for the end of sanctions, the Euros will entertain no serious discussion of punishments, penalties, or other strategies that could validate the reintroduction of sanctions through some new format. If this is the case, the Administration would want to keep mum about European rejection of American overtures as word of such a trans-Atlantic divide could tilt the congressional vote toward disapproval.
5. The Administration is too angry at Israel to give it independent means to undermine the deal. One idea proposed by members of the Iran Study Group and championed by my colleague Dennis Ross, former White House advisor on Iran policy, is to complement America's own enhanced deterrence against Iran by ensuring that Israel retains its own non-nuclear deterrent capability. This could be achieved by transferring to Israel the one conventional weapon in the U.S. arsenal that could do substantial damage to Iran's underground nuclear facilities, the Massive Ordnance Penetrator. In this scenario, Israel's direct and public opposition to the nuclear deal soured the Administration on any serious consideration of the idea. There is simply too much ill will between the leaderships of the two countries to contemplate providing Israel with the tools it could use to act on its own against Iran. Again, politics trumps interest.
6. The Administration considers the fact of the deal more important than its content, because the President genuinely sees it as transformative. According to this view, the transactional aspects of the deal -- such as details of monitoring, verification, and consequences for violations -- aren't really important compared to the meta-change it triggers: the re-entry of Shi'ite Iran into the international system as a regional power to whom the United States can turn to resolve local problems and balance the dysfunction of America's traditional Sunni allies. Since the announcement of the Vienna accord, Administration advocates have soft-pedaled these "transformational" arguments, but it is not difficult to connect the dots from statements by the President and his top aides to see this goal emerge as a key animating rationale for the agreement. If this is the case, then the White House has little reason to worry much about what happens when restrictions on Iran's enrichment and centrifuges expire in year ten or fifteen. By then, this argument goes, the Islamic Republic will already be a status quo partner cooperating with America on a broad range of regional issue.
7. The Administration is quietly pursuing a comprehensive set of improvements and only needs more time to present them to Congress and the American people. There are two variations of this explanation for the Administration's public posture -- one promising, the other worrisome. The promising scenario is that the White House does recognize the necessity and urgency of devising a comprehensive set of fixes to some of the problems raised in and by the agreement and is working diligently toward that goal. In this scenario, the enemy is time. The most important fixes for near-term problems need U.S.-European cooperation, but negotiating with the Europeans is only slightly less vexing than negotiating with the Iranians. There may just not be enough time before the congressional vote to work out the necessary details.
In that case, one hopes the Administration approaches responsible leaders in Congress -- such as Senators Bob Corker and Ben Cardin, chairman and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for example -- and asks for an extension of the 60-day review period so it can complete the task. The alternative may be for legislators to disapprove the agreement, signaling their willingness to reconsider if the Administration produces the improvements that would merit a new vote.
The worrisome alternative is that the White House is waiting until the last minute to offer one or two grudging concessions to its critics, in the hope that will mollify lingering undecided legislators thirsting for anything to justify a "yes" vote. The most likely of these would be a shift in declaratory policy that commits the U.S. to take action, including military force, to prevent Iran's accumulation of fissile material for a bomb 15 years from now. After all, it's pretty easy for the incumbent president to promise something that only binds a future president three elections from now. This eleventh-hour approach would fall short of a comprehensive set of improvements that would constitute a "better deal," but for the White House it would have the benefit of coming so late in the day as to limit demands to concede more.
Taken together, the odds aren't great. Out of seven possible scenarios, six and a half are deeply problematic; only one version of one explanation holds promise. For the sake of an improved proposal that truly advances American interests in the Middle East, let's hope that's the one that describes what is really going on.
**Robert Satloff is executive director of The Washington Institute.

Iranian Moderates Face Tall Obstacles in 2016 Elections
Mehdi Khalaji/Washington Institute/August 20/15
Uncertainty over the nuclear deal's economic effects will make it difficult for moderates to win more votes, as will the hardliners' greater capacity to shape public opinion and the electoral process.
On February 26, 2016, two elections will be held simultaneously in Iran: one for parliament (Majlis) and one for the Assembly of Experts, a largely ceremonial body whose importance may increase dramatically in the coming years due to its role in determining Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's eventual successor. Historically, the turnout for parliamentary elections has been quite high, while assembly elections suffer from the lowest participation rate of all Iranian polls. Besides the technical and financial advantages of holding two elections together, the regime hopes that Majlis voters will participate in the assembly vote too, believing that higher turnout might boost the legitimacy of a political body that has suffered from significant criticism over the past three decades. The main question then becomes whether allies of President Hassan Rouhani and other so-called moderates will be able to seize a significant number of seats in both institutions at once.
ELECTIONS IN AN UNDEMOCRATIC REGIME
Majlis members are elected for four years, and assembly members for seven. These elections are controlled by the Supreme Leader, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and other unelected power circles through various means.
First, prominent figures hoping to appear on the ballot typically need to determine beforehand whether Khamenei opposes their candidacy. The Supreme Leader does not explicitly advise anyone against running, but his office or other high-ranking officials will often reveal his views on specific cases. In May 2013, for example, moderate parliamentarian Mohammad Reza Khabbaz noted the following while advocating Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami for that year's presidential election: "Of course before announcing their candidacy, they should have a meeting with the Supreme Leader and obtain his tacit approval, because solving current problems in the country would not be possible without the Supreme Leader's support."
Second, when candidates register their names, the Guardian Council has to qualify them based on several criteria, most notably their full "practical" loyalty to the Supreme Leader and their recognition of his authority over all matters of the state (i.e., the principle of velayat-e faqih). The council consists of six ayatollahs and six lawyers; its main decisions are made by the ayatollahs, who are directly appointed by the Supreme Leader. The council's powerful secretary is Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, a leading hardliner who does not hide his anti-reformist and anti-moderate approach to domestic and foreign policy.
Third, once elections are complete, the Guardian Council is solely responsible for endorsing the final result, despite sharing supervision over the vote counting process with the Interior Ministry. Taken together, these and other measures usually ensure that election results do not stray too far from the planning and expectations of the Supreme Leader, the IRGC, the Guardian Council, and other institutions, unless the leadership has seriously miscalculated a given candidate's social power base.
MAJLIS AS A TOOL TO CONTROL THE PRESIDENT
Parliamentary elections are important in Iran for several reasons. As with municipal elections, many Iranians -- especially in small towns -- vote in Majlis elections less for political reasons and more as a response to local economic and administrative affairs. In recent years, the IRGC has taken advantage of this fact, placing dozens of former personnel in the Majlis by having them run for seats in small and marginal regions. The strategy has helped hardliners use the legislature as a tool for constraining the president's power, especially his ability to appoint cabinet members and influence budget planning. The current Majlis has also tried to play a bolder role in foreign and nuclear policy, which are traditionally not on its agenda.
By unofficially guiding the Majlis in this manner, the Supreme Leader can control the president without undertaking any responsibility for the resultant government policies. As cabinet spokesman Mohammad Bagher Nobakht stated while addressing parliament on May 12, "This is a usual custom, that the Supreme Leader expresses his views about some bills to the cabinet through the top Majlis officials."
CONSERVATIVES VS. CONSERVATIVES?
As the elections approach, the traditional struggle between reformists and conservatives has largely been replaced by divisions between powerful conservative factions, with the reformists/moderates pushed to the margins. To be sure, the reformists are still attempting to mobilize and unite. Last October, Hossein Marashi, a member of the Kargozaran Party, announced that his faction was planning to work within a "Reformist Grand Front" led by former president Khatami, with the aim of sending reformist and moderate candidates to Majlis. Similarly, Khatami's former vice president, Mohammad Reza Aref, has announced his candidacy, and reformist sources indicate that Khatami himself is considering a run as well.
Yet the deck is stacked against the moderates. For instance, Khatami was disgraced by the Supreme Leader in 2009 -- Iranian media are still officially banned from publishing any news about him, and he is barred from traveling abroad. As for Rouhani, his team seems to have no obvious plan for the elections, even though the deadline window for registering candidates (December 19-25) is fast approaching.
Meanwhile, the conservative camp seems more dynamic than the moderates. Conservatives are no longer monolithic; various factions are expressing serious disagreements on key issues such as the nuclear deal. This will make it easier for them to represent the major political and economic tendencies of potential voters and fill the vacuum that will be created by the Guardian Council's inevitable disqualification of important moderate and reformist figures. On August 1, however, Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, a prominent conservative close to the moderates, told Iranian media that neither reformists nor "moderate conservatives" have any clear plan for the elections.
MANAGING A SUCCESSION CRISIS
As mentioned above, the Experts Assembly is constitutionally in charge of appointing a new Supreme Leader; it is also tasked with overseeing his work and dismissing him in case he fails to perform his duties, but its actual ability to hold him accountable has been virtually nil in practice. For example, one of the reasons why the institution has been criticized so heavily over the years is because of the manner in which former assembly member Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri was dismissed in 1989. Flouting the assembly's sole authority to remove members, the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini dismissed Montazeri in part because of his protest against the Supreme Leader's illegal 1988 order to execute more than four thousand political prisoners. Khomeini's move showed that the assembly was simply another instrument in the hands of the Supreme Leader rather than an authority to hold him responsible.
Regarding its role in succession, the assembly elected Khamenei to follow Khomeini nearly three decades ago, but the legal procedure by which he was chosen continues to raise serious questions. After the next assembly is elected in February, it will be in place until 2023, so it will most likely face the challenge of naming a successor to the seventy-six-year-old Khamenei. Therefore, despite the institution's historically ceremonial role, the next set of assembly members are poised to become key political players. While the IRGC and other powerful institutions will of course wield strong influence on succession decisionmaking, the Experts Assembly is the sole authority endowed with the legal power to appoint and legitimize the next Supreme Leader.
As for the assembly's composition, all members must be ayatollahs, the highest rank in the clerical hierarchy. Yet this title has become increasingly political under the Islamic Republic, and achieving it often reveals more about one's status within the regime than one's theological credentials. In addition, the next assembly will be expanded to ninety-nine members -- thirteen seats are being added for the February vote.
In a recent interview with Tolou weekly, Rafsanjani announced that he will run in the assembly election. He also advocated the candidacy of Hasan Khomeini, a grandson of the Islamic Republic's founder and a close confidant of Rafsanjani and Khatami. Yet Rafsanjani remains suspicious of the Guardian Council and has repeatedly accused it of manipulating elections. The council disqualified him from even participating in the 2013 presidential election, and he lost the 2005 vote to hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad under controversial circumstances.
CONCLUSION
In an effort to help moderate candidates defeat conservatives in February, Rouhani will likely play the only major card in his hand: his success in lifting sanctions after two years of tough nuclear negotiations with the P5+1. The main theme of his 2013 presidential campaign and the past two years of discourse was his promise that the people's living conditions would change drastically once sanctions were lifted.
Yet the reality is that most Iranians are unlikely to feel these positive effects by February, if at all. Even if the nuclear agreement receives prompt final approval in both the United States and Iran (see "Why Khamenei's Official Approval of the Nuclear Deal Matters"), the complexity of the sanctions regime and the international banking system will probably delay its most tangible effects, as will a lingering lack of confidence among investors and bankers for resuming business with Iran. Moreover, while Iran's currency strengthened for a few weeks before negotiations ended, the stock and currency markets both began to drop again right after the deal was signed in July. Therefore, moderates cannot rely on the economic factor for attracting voters. In fact, Rouhani's opponents may well use the slow pace of post-sanctions improvements to accuse him of being an incompetent manager and exaggerating the link between a good economy and nuclear compromise. For now, Rouhani's team is very busy finalizing the nuclear deal and planning for the subsequent economic changes, but they may have to adjust their expectations about how much this will change voters' living conditions in the short term.
Another obstacle is the fact that moderates have no strong media or organizational leverage for influencing public opinion. In addition to Khatami's ban, reformists are generally blacklisted by establishment media outlets, and their political organizations (e.g., Mosharekat-e Iran-e Islami and Mujahedin-e Enghelab-e Islami) are either banned or not very active due to regime pressure.
Finally, Rouhani allies were no doubt discouraged by the fact that arch-conservative Jannati was not only reappointed as Guardian Council secretary, but also named the head of the committee for monitoring Majlis and Experts Assembly elections. Both of these recent moves send a strong message to all potential candidates outside the conservative camp.
**Mehdi Khalaji is the Libitzky Family Fellow at The Washington Institute.

Saudi Arabia to West: Improve Your Human Rights Record
Raymond Ibrahim/FrontPage Magazine/August 20, 2015
Slightly edited version of article originally published under the title, “Saudi Arabia: The World’s Greatest Hypocrite.”
Abdulmajeed Al-Omari, director for external relations at Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Islamic Affairs, had a lot to say about how Western countries can better respect their citizens’ human rights at an international symposium in France last month.
Saudi Arabia is preaching to the international community about the need to confront “intolerance, extremism and human rights violations.” According to a July 26 report in the Saudi Gazette, “Saudi Arabia has reiterated its call on the international community to criminalize any act vilifying religious beliefs and symbols of faith as well as all kinds of discrimination based on religion.”
Saudi Arabia wants Western cartoonists, comedians, and others—people who represent only their individual selves—to stop mocking the religious beliefs and symbols of Islam, even as the Arabian kingdom’s own institutionalized policy is to vilify and discriminate against the religious beliefs and symbols of all other faiths.
Not a single non-Muslim worship building is allowed there; the highest Islamic authority decreed that it is “necessary to destroy all the churches of the region.” Whenever Christians are suspected of meeting in a house for worship—or as one Saudi official once complained, “plotting to celebrate Christmas“—they are arrested and punished.
Like ISIS, Saudi Grand Mufti Abdul Aziz Al-Sheikh has said that it is “necessary to destroy all the churches of the region.”
Any cross or other non-Muslim symbol found is confiscated and destroyed. Anyone caught trying to smuggle Bibles or any other “publications that have prejudice to any other religious belief other than Islam” can be executed.
In 2011, a Colombian soccer-player “was arrested by the Saudi moral police after customers in a Riyadh shopping mall expressed outrage over the sports player’s religious tattoos, which included the face of Jesus of Nazareth on his arm.” In 2010 a Romanian player kissed the tattoo of a cross he had on his arm after scoring a goal, causing public outrage.
And yet, Saudi Arabia has the unmitigated gall to ask the West—where Islam is freely practiced, where mosques and Korans proliferate, and where Muslims are granted full equality—to cease “discrimination based on religion.”
Continues the Saudi Gazette:
Addressing an international symposium on media coverage of religious symbols based on international law, which started in this French city on Saturday, a senior Saudi official said the Kingdom emphasized years ago that the international community must act urgently to confront ethnic, religious and cultural intolerance, which has become widespread in all communities and peoples of the world.
Meanwhile, back in the real world, few countries exhibit as much “ethnic, religious and cultural intolerance” as does the Arabian kingdom. Along with the aforementioned discrimination and intolerance against all other religions, Saudi Arabia is notoriously clannish and racist.
Ten percent of the population is denied equal rights because of their race; black men are barred from holding many government positions; black women are often put on trial for “witchcraft”; castrated African slaves are sold on Facebook in the birthplace of Islam, and its princes are known to beat their black slaves to death. Human Rights Watch has described conditions for foreign workers in Saudi Arabia as resembling slavery.
Ethiopians protest the prolonged detention of their countrymen at a February 2012 demonstration outside the Saudi embassy.
Worse of all is if you’re black and Christian. After 35 Christian Ethiopians were arrested by the Saudis and abused in prison for almost a year, simply for holding a private house prayer, one of them said after being released: “They are full of hatred towards non-Muslims.”
This is unsurprising considering that the Saudi education system makes it a point to indoctrinate Muslim children with hatred, teaching that “the Apes are the people of the Sabbath, the Jews; and the Swine are the infidels of the communion of Jesus, the Christians.”
According to Saudi novelist Hani Naqshabandi, “Our religious institutions do not give us room to exercise free thought…. They [Saudi institutions] said that the Christian is an infidel, a denizen of hell, an enemy to Allah and Islam. So we said, ‘Allah’s curse on them.’”
Again, bear in mind that all this is official Saudi policy—not the “free expressions” of individuals, which the Saudis are condemning as creating “ethnic, religious and cultural intolerance” around the world.
The Saudi Gazette goes on to quote Abdulmajeed Al-Omari, a senior Saudi official speaking at the recent international symposium in France which hosted representatives from 16 European nations. He said that Western “freedom of expression without limits or restrictions” are “abuses [that] bred intolerance, extremism and human rights violations…”
Again, it bears reemphasizing that in the West individuals are free to express themselves. And it’s just that—expression, not action (as in murder, terrorism, rape, enslavement, church bombings, or the slaughter of “apostates”).
As for Western governments, thanks to political correctness, not only do they discourage freedom of expression but honest, objective talk concerning Islam is suppressed (hence every Western leader maintains that ISIS “has nothing to do with Islam,” AKA, “the religion of peace”). Meanwhile, it is precisely Islamic teachings that breed “intolerance, extremism and human rights violations,” and not just in Saudi Arabia but all throughout the Muslim world. And it is precisely these teachings that prompt Western peoples to criticize Islam, including through cartoons.
None of this is enough to embarrass the Saudis from their farce:
Al-Omari said the Saudi participation in the symposium falls in line with its efforts to support the principles of justice, humanity, promotion of values and the principles of tolerance in the world as well as to emphasize the importance of respecting religions and religious symbols. Actually, because of Saudi Arabia’s absolute lack of “justice, humanity, promotion of values and the principles of tolerance,” even the U.S. State Department lists the home of Islam and Muhammad as one of eight “Countries of Particular Concern.”
Thus in an ultra-hypocritical manner, Saudi Arabia asks the international community to stop exercising freedom of expression—even as it openly and unapologetically persecutes non-Muslims, discriminates against non-Saudis, and violates the most basic human rights on a daily basis. It still remains to determine which is more surreal, more unbelievable: that Saudi Arabia, which tops the charts of state-enforced religious intolerance and ethnic discrimination, is calling on the West “to confront ethnic, religious and cultural intolerance,” or that the West deigns to participate in such disgracefully hypocritical forums.
**Raymond Ibrahim, a Judith Friedman Rosen writing fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a Shillman fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center and author of Crucified Again: Exposing Islam’s New War in Christians.

Election Time in Turkey: Tossing the Dice Again
Burak Bekdil/Gatestone Institute/August 20/15
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6369/election-time-turkey
If the AKP can win 276 seats and form a government, it may then seek alliances in parliament to amend the constitution in line with the would-be Sultan's wishes. President Erdogan is on a dangerous path. He knows no limits in breaching the constitution -- which it is his duty is to safeguard. He is wrong to claim that "whether one likes it or not, Turkey's administrative system has changed." It has not changed, although he is trying to change it. "When he [Erdogan] does go down, he will bring down many with him. We must make sure it is not the whole country." — Fuad Kavur, Turkish-British film and opera director and producer. By this autumn, the Turks will have gone to the ballot box four times in about a year and a half. Three of the elections had been scheduled in advance: municipal in March 2014, presidential in August 2014, and parliamentary in June 2015. But apparently the Turks will have to elect another parliament a few months after the one they voted for on June 7. Not because there was large-scale vote-rigging in the last election, but rather because President Recep Tayyip Erdogan did not like the election results.
After governing Turkey for nearly 12 years as prime minister (head of the executive power), Erdogan last year devised an ambitious plan: He would run for the (largely symbolic) presidency, entrust his Justice and Development Party (AKP) to a reliable prime minister who would win a large enough majority to pass constitutional amendments in the June 7 elections, and amend the constitution to introduce an executive presidential system. This would effectively assign all power to the president, thus paving the way for a modern-day, elected sultanate system. Before June 7, Erdogan -- who as president is supposed to remain non-partisan according to the constitution -- actively campaigned for the AKP, demanding votes enough to earn a comfortable absolute majority of 400 seats in Turkey's 550-member assembly, capable of amending the constitution. Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in violation of the constitution, campaigns for the AKP party three days before the June 7 parliamentary elections. (Image source: Canli video screenshot)
Instead, the AKP won merely 258 seats, not even a simple majority sufficient to form a single-party government. Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu -- largely known as "Erdogan's Medvedev" -- was faced with the choice of signing a coalition deal with one of his political nemeses in parliament: either the main opposition social democratic Republican People's Party (CHP); the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP); or the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP). For over a month, Davutoglu pretended to be negotiating a German-style "grand coalition" with the CHP, although it was an open secret that he was under pressure from Erdogan (his "Putin") not to sign a deal with any of the rival parties. Instead, Davutoglu had to maneuver for re-election in the autumn. Any coalition government would be the end of Erdogan's dreams for an overriding, sultan-like system. So he wanted to throw the dice again.
Formal coalition talks between the AKP and CHP unsurprisingly failed on August 13, with Davutoglu pointing to early polls instead of a much-needed political reconciliation between Turkey's Islamists and secularists. A historic opportunity was missed, according to CHP's leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu. Erdogan's move has a mathematical justification: He calculates that in new elections, the AKP will come out on top of every rival. With a little effort, the AKP can try to broker an election alliance with two conservative splinter parties whose votes on June 7 totaled a mere 2%. That mere 2%, plus the chances of winning back some constituencies that the AKP lost only marginally to rivals, are not too likely but not altogether impossible scenarios.
If the AKP performed worse in a re-election than it did in June, that would not mathematically make a difference: For Erdogan there is no difference between the AKP's present 258 seats or, say, 243 seats in a re-election, as both would mean a coalition government and no constitutional change that he craves. But, he further calculates, if the AKP can win 276 seats and form a government, it may then seek alliances in parliament to amend the constitution in line with the would-be Sultan's wishes. Erdogan does not hide his ambitions or his totally unconstitutional presidency. He said: "There is a president [himself] with de facto power in the country, not a symbolic one. The president should conduct his duties for the nation directly, but within his authority. Whether one accepts it or not, Turkey's administrative system has changed. Now, what should be done is to update this de facto situation in the legal framework of the constitution."To which a prominent Turkish columnist, Ahmet Hakan, replied that "This is almost a coup d'état." The Turkish president is on a dangerous path. He knows no limits in breaching the constitution -- which it is his duty is to safeguard. He is wrong to claim that "whether one likes it or not, Turkey's administrative system has changed." It has not changed, although he is trying to change it. The constitutional articles regulating his powers are precisely the same as they were for his predecessors.
Fuad Kavur, a world-renowned Turkish-British director and producer of film and opera, who is based in London, wrote to this author: "Now that Erdogan's cover is blown, people are beginning to see him for what he is -- a wounded animal fighting for survival. Moreover, he is trying to eclipse parliamentary elections, saying what really counts is the presidential election -- which he won. Accordingly, nothing else matters -- people chose him ... parliament is an irrelevance ... "This precisely is the point we should stick to -- "saying" something does not mean it is true. (Although, he is using the same technique as Hitler's propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, who said, "repeat a lie often enough, people will believe in it. "The real truth is, the man is suffering with advance stages of Paranoïd Schizophrenia- as in 'cut from reality.' The game is over, but he is in denial. "This is a nightmare for Turks, a dark page in our history, fast coming to an end. The nation soon will wake up and wonder, as Germans did after 1945, what possessed them to follow that evil lunatic. "Still, make no mistake -- like Hitler, he too will fight on until the very last moment. Indeed, when he does go down, he will bring down many with him. We must make sure it is not the whole country."
**Burak Bekdil, based in Ankara, is a Turkish columnist for the Hürriyet Daily and a Fellow at the Middle East Forum.

Nuke Deal or Not, Iran Has Already Declared War on Us
Lawrence A. Franklin/Gatestone Institute.org/August 20/15
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6354/iran-declared-war
U.S. policymakers who hope that the nuclear deal will help nudge the Islamic revolutionary state into becoming a normal member of the international community seem to forget the past. Policymakers, journalists, and intelligence analysts had all predicted that the era of former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami was a sure sign of the evolution of the revolution. Khatami was replaced by the even more hardline president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. It seems clear that despite the American political establishment's failure to recognize that a state of war already exists between Iran and the United States, the Islamic Republic has no doubt with whom it is at war. Iran has been at war with the "Great Satan" (USA) since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Its opening move was the regime's seizure of the American Embassy and its taking U.S. diplomats hostage for 444 days in 1979-1980. Technically, the move was an internationally recognized casus belli, legitimate cause for war.
In addition, the Iranian regime's proxy terrorist group, Hezbollah, engineered the murder of 241 U.S. soldiers, sailors, and marines in Lebanon on October 23, 1983. Iran also sponsored the truck bombing that murdered 19 US Air Force personnel at the Khobar Towers housing complex in Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996,[1] in an attack allegedly executed by a Bahrain-based cell of Hezbollah, with the cooperation of a Saudi-trained Hezbollah cell.[2] Iran was behind the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks.[3] The Islamic Republic's intelligence services facilitated travel across Iran by several of the hijackers in the weeks leading up to 9/11.[4] Additionally, after the 9/11 attacks, Iran granted refuge, reconstitution, and a base of operations for several high-level al-Qaeda terrorists.[5] After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in April 2003, when Tehran activated its underground intelligence network in Iraq to target American troops, Iran was responsible either directly or indirectly for about a third of U.S. casualties in Iraq.[6]
The Islamic Republic also has given military assistance to the Afghan Taliban to kill U.S. and coalition troops in Afghanistan.[7] Iran's Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) naval assets have repeatedly instigated confrontations with U.S. naval ships in Persian Gulf waters.
IRGC gunboats also have threatened commercial shipping, as well as U.S. and allied military assets in Persian Gulf waters, including the Strait of Hormuz. In late April 2015, Iran seized the Marshall Islands-flagged vessel Maersk Tigris, and detained the ship and crew for weeks. In July, several IRGC gunboats surrounded the U.S.-flagged Maersk Kensington. The most recent Iranian provocation reportedly occurred this month, on August 4, when an Iranian Navy Vosper Class frigate pointed a deck-mounted machine gun at an American helicopter that had just landed on an allied warship. Tehran's assistance to the Shia Houthi tribesmen in Yemen has enabled Iran to expand its territorial control of the country. If the Houthi become the dominant force in Yemen, Iran would be in a position to threaten shipping in the Bab el-Mandab Strait, a maritime chokepoint between the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. A blockade there, as well as at the Strait of Hormuz on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, would be a clear violation of freedom of navigation on the high seas, a vital international interest acknowledged by the U.S.
Iran has also taken its offensive against the United States to the Western hemisphere. Iran has forged intelligence relationships with several Latin American countries that do not have friendly diplomatic relationships with the U.S., such as Cuba, Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia. Hezbollah, Iran's proxy terrorist group, has also infiltrated parts of the United States, with sleeper cells in Dearborn, Michigan; Charlotte, North Carolina; and several other locales.[8] On a strategic political plane, Iran probably believes that it has been able to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its ally, the "Little Satan," Israel, over the Obama Administration's effort to forge a negotiated nuclear treaty with the Iran.[9] This strategy has also been applied to America's political and military alliances with the conservative Sunni Arab governments on the Arabian Peninsula.[10] The IRGC also continues to manage several weapons-development projects, including intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) systems capable of launching nuclear-armed re-entry vehicles at the continental United States.[11] It seems clear that despite the American political establishment's failure to recognize that a state of war already exists between Iran and the United States, the Islamic Republic has no doubt with whom it is at war.
Left: Senior Iranian cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Movahedi Kermani, speaking on July 17 in Tehran, behind a banner reading "We Will Trample Upon America" and "We defeat the United States." Right: Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, proclaims "Death to America" on March 2. The diminution of American influence in the region, the destruction of the "Zionist Entity" (Israel), and challenging the legitimacy of Sunni Arab Gulf monarchies appear to be the main motive forces driving Iran's foreign policy.
The regime's hardliners use their hostility to the "Great Satan" (America) to demonstrate their loyalty to the Islamic Revolution. U.S. policymakers who hope that the nuclear deal will help nudge the Islamic revolutionary state into becoming a normal member of the international community seem to forget the past. Policymakers, journalists, and intelligence analysts had all predicted that the era of former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami was a sure sign of the evolution of the revolution. Khatami was replaced by the even more hardline president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
***Dr. Lawrence A. Franklin was the Iran Desk Officer for Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. He also served on active duty with the U.S. Army and as a Colonel in the Air Force Reserve, where he was a Military Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Israel.
[1] Congressional Testimony in 2002 by FBI former Director Louie Freeh and NPR radio interview and U.S Federal Court Testimony. Freeh accuses Iran's Ministry of Intelligence of supervising truck bomb attack on Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia citing several Saudi citizens and a Lebanese Hezbollah operative.
[2] "The Secret War with Iran" by Ronen Bergman. Free Press, N.Y. 2007. p.195.
[3] US District Court Rules Iran Behind 9/11 Attacks." District Court Judge George B. Daniels, in a decision handed down on 15 December 2011, ruled in Havlish et al v. bin-Laden et al that Iran and Hezbollah materially and directly supported al Qaeda in the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.
[4] See comments of former DIA Director LTG Michael Flynn and seized Bin Laden documents that detail the relationship, as well as Ronen Bergman's chapter on links between Al-Qaeda and Iran.
[5] 9/11 Commission Report.
[6] U. S. Ambassador James Jeffrey believes that at least a quarter of U.S. combat deaths in Iraq are attributable to Iran. 26 August 2010. Reuters. Other estimates reach the one-third figure.
[7] "Dem Congressman on Iran Sanctions Relief: 'They'll Have a Few Billion Left over to Kill Americans'" by Daniel Greenfield, FrontPageMagazine.com, July 15, 2015. The article quotes former member of the Pentagon's Joint Improvised Explosive Device defeat Organization that 500 U.S. combat deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan attributed to Iran is probably on the low side.
[8] "The Secret War with Iran" by Ronen Bergman, p.205. "Al-Mabarrat – A Hezbollah Charitable Front in Dearborn, MI?" by Steven Emerson 22 July 2006.
[9] Supreme Leader Khamenei has just published the book "Palestine," in which he writes that one objective of Iranian statecraft is to encourage "Israel Fatigue" in America re its alliance with the "Zionist Entity,"
[10] Several articles on Arab Gulf allies of U.S. having qualms about possible U.S. shift toward an era of cooperation with Iran. For example: "Like Israel, U.S. Arab Allies Fear Obama's Iran Nuclear Deal" by Yaroslav Trofimov, Wall Street Journal, 4 March 2015; "Why Arab Countries Fear the Iran Deal" by Geneive Abdo, The National Interest, 7 April 2015.
[11] Several late July/early August 2015 Congressional hearings, Senate Armed Services Committee, on Iran's ICBM programs.

Chief Palestinian Negotiator Saeb Erekat's Positions On Israel Show Increasing Radicalization
MEMRI/August 19, 2015 Special Dispatch No.6137
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud 'Abbas has confirmed that on July 23, 2015, Saeb Erekat, for the past two decades chief Palestinian Authority (PA) negotiator in the ongoing talks with Israel (though now in an unofficial capacity), had met in Jordan with Sylvan Shalom, the Israeli minister in charge of the negotiations. At that meeting, said 'Abbas, Erekat had stipulated that the PA will renew the negotiations and meet its obligations under previous agreements only if Israel ceases construction in the settlements and releases 30 Palestinian prisoners. Recently 'Abbas appointed Erekat, whom many Palestinians hold responsible for the ongoing failure of the talks with Israel, as PLO Executive Committee secretary-general, replacing Yassir 'Abd Rabbo whom 'Abbas had fired from this post. Palestinian dignitaries and columnists view Erekat's appointment to this post as 'Abbas's vote of confidence in Erekat, and also as a signal that 'Abbas views him as a candidate to succeed him as PA president.
In recent years, Erekat has conspicuously taken inflexible positions towards Israel; he also led the measure to indict Israel at the International Criminal Court. Some assess that the positions taken by Erekat were designed to project a patriotic and combative approach to mask his meager negotiating achievements, while rallying public support for his future PA presidential candidacy.
Erekat's inflexibility vis-à-vis Israel has been expressed as follows: calling for internationalizing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and convening an international conference; supporting an economic boycott of Israel; and depicting Hamas as a movement that does not engage in terrorist activity.
Erekat also accuses Israel of rejecting a two-state solution, of attempting to have 'Abbas removed from his post, and of being a terrorist state like the Islamic State (ISIS). He also maintains that Israel's actions in the July-August 2014 Gaza war were tantamount to extermination of the Gazans.
The following is a review of some statements made by Erekat on a number of issues:
Internationalizing The Conflict
Erekat chairs the committee tasked with collecting documents and testimonial evidence in preparation for prosecuting Israel at the International Criminal Court (ICC), and is active in this matter as part of the PA's work to internationalize the conflict. In a speech to the Palestinian National Council in Jordan, he said that the current Palestinian strategy is to establish the status of Palestine as a country under occupation and to have Palestine join additional international agreements and covenants. "We want an international conference to end the occupation," he said.[1] At his April 2015 meeting with UN representative Nikolay Mladenov, he asked for an international peace conference to be convened that would include the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the other relevant parties under UN sponsorship "in order to set a timetable for the Israeli occupation forces' withdrawal from the state of Palestine to the June 4, 1967 borders."[2]
At his meetings with international representatives in January 2015, Erekat called on the international community "to support efforts to summon Israel before the International Criminal Court in response to the new construction plans in the settlements that destroy the two-state option and conclusively eliminate the chance for reaching peace."[3]
In a March 2015 press announcement, Erekat explained: "Elements, including the U.S., are attempting to dissuade us from turning to the International Criminal Court, and I tell them that we are the victim, and that whoever fears punishment must stop committing crimes. The criminal must be approached and must be obligated to stop the crimes… Israel has committed crimes such as land expropriation, imprisonment, house demolition, expulsion, and assassinations. Israel's holding on to PA tax monies is piracy in the full sense of the word. The world must require it to transfer the money. This measure is a war crime… We will work to internationalize the Palestinian problem."[4]
When, in February 2014, the PA sought to bring up a draft resolution at the UN on ending the occupation, Erekat warned, "If the U.S. [uses its] veto to thwart the Arab demand that the Security Council set a date for ending the Israeli occupation of the '67 territories, the Palestinians will continue with their activity to join 522 international agreements, and will cease all kinds of security coordination with Israel."[5] These statements by Erekat provoked a harsh reaction from U.S. State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf, who on February 19, 2015 said: "We are, of course, concerned about the recent comments by Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat. We've said all along that it's important to create a positive atmosphere around these discussions."[6]
In June 2014, Erekat's criticism that 'Abbas was taking his time approaching the ICC was leaked. Erekat demanded a vote on this matter in the PLO Executive Committee, and, although 13 members supported Erekat and only four supported 'Abbas, 'Abbas stubbornly resisted making a decision on the issue. Erekat told him bluntly: "[Israeli Prime Minister] Netanyahu has stripped you of all authority. You need permission from an Israeli lieutenant colonel at [Israeli Civil Authority headquarters in] Bethel to go to Jordan, and [this officer even] determines how many vehicles will be in your motorcade." Later he commented: "The Israelis deliberately humiliate 'Abbas."[7]
In February 2014, Erekat warned that, if U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's efforts to salvage the negotiations failed, the PA had "a plan of attack [comprising] legal claims against Israel at the Hague [i.e. in the ICC]."[8]
Also, in May 2015, Erekat spoke about "the importance of having the EU boycott all categories of Israeli products."[9]
Hamas Is Not A Terrorist Movement
From time to time, Erekat expresses a conciliatory stance towards Hamas, which led 'Abbas to dispatch him to meet with Hamas political bureau chief Khaled Mash'al in Qatar to discuss the joint Hamas-PA delegation to the Cairo negotiations during the July-August 2014 Gaza war. At a Ramallah conference, Erekat said: "I declare, on behalf of President Abu Mazen ['Abbas] and the PLO Executive Committee, that Hamas is a Palestinian movement that never was and never will be a terrorist movement."`[10] He said: "The Hamas movement and the other Palestinian [resistance] factions are not required to recognize the principles of the Quartet... They are not required to recognize either Israel or [previous] agreements."[11]
In an April 2014 position paper, Erekat proposed that an urgent Palestinian National Council meeting be convened, with participation by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, to elect a new PLO Executive Committee.[12]
Israel Is Exterminating The Gazans; There Is No Difference Between Israel And ISIS
Erekat has accused Israel of exterminating Gazans in the July-August 2014 Gaza war, and also of terrorism. In September 2014, he said: "The president '[Abbas] has described the Gaza war in 2014 as extermination; this angered the Americans and the Israelis. Twelve thousand [Gaza] residents were killed or wounded; 91 families were obliterated and 50,000 homes were destroyed. The number of those uprooted from their homes totaled a third of the population. If this is not extermination, then what is?"[13]
At a January 2015 conference in Jericho, Erekat said: "There is no difference between the terrorism carried out by the organization of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi [i.e. the Islamic State – ISIS] and Israel's terrorism. The elimination of terrorism requires "dry[ing] up the [Israeli] settlements."[14] In a January 2015 interview, Erekat told the pro-Hizbullah Al-Mayadeen TV: "There is no difference between ISIS, which murders journalists, and Netanyahu, who allowed the murder of Muhammad Abu Khdeir[15] and who caused the murder of [PA] minister Ziad Abu 'Ein[16]."[17]
In September 2014, Erekat said: "It is necessary to dry up the wellsprings of terrorism. The sights of this summer were terrible: a group of people [ISIS] used the religion of Islam to carry out terrorism and beheadings. We condemn this. From our standpoint, there's no difference between this terrorism and the immolation of the martyr Muhammad Abu Khdeir. The highest level of terrorism is state terrorism.
"It is necessary to dry up the wellsprings that feed terrorism. If decision-makers in the West believe that terror can be vanquished without drying up its sources, they need to reassess the issue, and must dry up the swamp of the Israeli occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state whose capital is holy Jerusalem."[18]
Israel Is Trying To Eliminate Abu Mazen
In response to statements by former Israeli foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman that 'Abbas is not a partner to peace, Erekat stated: "Israel is trying to get rid of President 'Abbas, like what happened with [Yasser] Arafat, because of his adherence to principles."[19] In response to reports of indirect Israel-Hamas negotiations, he said: "Israel wants to get rid of Abu Mazen, just as it previously got rid of Arafat, by launching negotiations with Hamas."[20]
Not A Single Israeli Settler Will Remain In The Palestinian State
In response to statements by Prime Minister Netanyahu that Israel would not evacuate a single settlement or settler under a permanent agreement, Erekat said, in January 2014: "Whoever says he wants to leave the settlers is in fact saying that he does not want the establishment of a Palestinian state. We will not allow a single Israeli settler to remain in a Palestinian state."[21]
Endnotes:
[1] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), May 12, 2015.
[2] Paltoday.ps, April 30, 2015.
[3] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), January 31, 2015.
[4] Al-sharq.com, March 30, 2015.
[5] Paltoday.ps, October 22, 2014.
[6] State.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/02/221816.htm#ISRAEL, January 19, 2015.
[7] Amad.ps, June 11, 2014.
[8] Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), February 17, 2014.
[9] Alwatanvoice.com, May 9, 2015.
[10] Amad.ps, April 5, 2015.
[11] Alresalah.ps, June 25, 2015.
[12] Paltoday.ps, April 3, 2014
[13] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), September 30, 2014.
[14] Wafa.ps, January 1, 2015.
[15] Muhammad Abu Khdeir was burned to death in July 2014 by a group of Israeli extremists.
[16] PA minister Ziad Abu 'Ein died while participating in a December 2014 protest march against the Israeli occupation, following an altercation with Israeli soldiers.
[17] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), January 3, 2015; Almayadeen.net. January 2, 2015.
[18] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), September 30, 2014.
[19] Maannews.net, June 7, 2013.
[20] Alresalah.ps, June 25, 2015.
[21] Samannews.com, January 27, 2014

Critical Points To Consider In Understanding The Iranian Nuclear Deal: Part III
By: Y. Carmon, and A. Braunstein*
MEMRI/August 20, 2015 Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No.1182
Introduction
The following analysis is the third in a series which discusses the Iranian nuclear deal. This analysis will explain that United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231, which was only supposed to be an endorsement of the JCPOA, actually includes an additional annex that does not exist in the JCPOA. This annex, called "Annex B: Statement," refers to critical issues such as the arms embargo on Iran and Iran's use and development of ballistic missiles. This analysis does not intend to be an overall assessment of the deal.
Iran Insisted On Relegating Disputed Issues (Arms Embargo, Ballistic Missiles) To UNSCR 2231 With The Clear Intent Of Violating It
The JCPOA and UNSCR 2231 are different documents. There are several key differences between the JCPOA and UNSCR 2231, all of which are contained in Annex B. Their inclusion in the resolution and exclusion from the JCPOA raises the question: why are these issues not included in the JCPOA?
It is first important to explain the difference between the JCPOA and UNSCR 2231. UNSCR 2231 states that, in regard to the JCPOA, "…Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Security Council's decisions, [the decision which] 1. Endorses the JCPOA and urges its full implementation on the timetable established in the JCPOA…"[1] Secretary-General of the U.N. Ban Ki-moon reiterated in his address following the endorsement of the JCPOA on July 20, 2015: "Resolution 2231 will ensure the enforcement of the JCPOA. It establishes procedures that will facilitate the JCPOA's implementation, enabling all States to carry out their obligations contained in the Agreement."[2]
While these statements seem to portray UNSCR 2231 as a binding document, it is not. Many resolutions passed by the United Nations, whether by the General Assembly or the Security Council, are political documents, and are not in and of themselves legally binding agreements or enforceable declarations.[3]
The Iranian perspective regarding UNSCR 2231 hinges entirely on its non-binding nature: Iran deems only the JCPOA to be binding. This view was asserted in interviews given by Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Araghchi said in an interview on Iranian TV Channel 2 on July 20, 2015, "We told them [the Americans] explicitly [that if you insist on including these articles on the arms and missile embargoes in the JCPOA, then], 'There is no agreement,' and we will not accept an agreement in which embargoes on weapons and missiles continue… At the end, they [the P5+1] said, 'Then we will put the issue of the embargoes on arms and missiles into the Security Council resolution.' [Indeed] in UNSCR 2231, there is no imposition on Iran regarding missiles, but there is an imposition regarding an arms embargo for 5 years."[4] Araghchi further explained the rationale for including the arms and missiles provisions only in UNSCR 2231: in the same interview, he stated that the JCPOA and UNSCR 2231 are two separate documents, and Iran is only obligated to adhere to the JCPOA – it has violated U.N. resolutions in the past without penalty.[5] Similarly, Zarif stated in a conference held at the daily Ittila'at with the participation of senior Iranian negotiators on August 9, 2015: "There is a difference between the JCPOA and UNSCR 2231. Violating the JCPOA has consequences while violating UNSCR 2231 has no consequences."[6]
The subjects relegated to the resolution with the Iranian intent not to adhere to them are outlined in Annex B: the possible provision to Iran of materials that could contribute to the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems; the arms embargo; and the missiles embargo.[7]
UNSCR 2231: States May Provide Material And Financial Supplies Which Could "Contribute To The Development Of Nuclear Weapon Delivery Systems" To Iran If Approved By Security Council
UNSCR 2231 states, "All States may participate in and permit the activities described below provided that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to permit such activity: (a) the supply, sale or transfer…of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in S/2015/546 and of any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; and (b) the provision to Iran of any technology or technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, or Iran's acquisition of an interest in any commercial activity in another State, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph or related to the activities described in paragraph 3..."[8]
This provision stipulates that as long as it is approved by the Security Council and "…Iran commit[s] not to use such items for development of nuclear weapon delivery systems,"[9] states are allowed to provide financial and material supplies to Iran which could eventually facilitate the construction of nuclear weapon delivery systems. While the JCPOA declares that states are allowed to provide certain materials to Iran pending approval by the Joint Commission, i.e. "…all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, and all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2…as well as any further items if the relevant State determines that they could contribute to activities inconsistent with the JCPOA…"[10] it does not mention anything specific about providing materials that could contribute to developing nuclear weapon delivery systems.
Iran rejected the inclusion of this provision in the JCPOA, which they perceive as more binding than the resolution. They agreed to its inclusion in UNSCR 2231 because, from their perspective, U.N. resolutions may be violated without consequence.
UNSCR 2231: Iran May Trade Arms Immediately If Approved By Security Council, May Trade Without Approval In 5 Years
UNSCR 2231 specifies that states may trade arms with Iran immediately, provided that such trade is approved by the Security Council: "All States may participate in and permit, provided that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to approve: the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from or through their territories, or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, to Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, of any battles tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, and the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in this subparagraph. This paragraph shall apply until the date five years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier. "[11]
The abovementioned provision which deals with the limitations put on Iran regarding arms trade has been incorrectly discussed in the media: states are not banned from trading arms with Iran for 5 years. Arms trade is, in fact, permitted immediately if the Security Council approves it, and after 5 years, arms can be traded without Security Council approval.
Such a limitation that is dependent on Security Council approval was intentionally excluded from the JCPOA by Iran. Instead, Iran insisted that it only be included in UNSCR 2231, which both Araghchi and Zarif declared to be non-binding.
UNSCR 2231: Iran "Called Upon Not To Undertake Any Activity Related To Ballistic Missiles"
UNSCR 2231 states, "Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology, until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier."[12]
This provision "calls upon" Iran not to engage in the development of ballistic missiles as a means of delivering nuclear weapons for 8 years. Iran rejected the inclusion of this provision in the JCPOA and agreed to its mention only in UNSCR 2231, which it does not consider to be binding.
****Y. Carmon is President and Founder of MEMRI; and A. Braunstein is a Research Fellow at MEMRI.
Endnotes:
[1] Introduction, page 2, UNSCR 2231. See link for full text: http://www.un.org/en/sc/inc/pages/pdf/pow/RES2231E.pdf
[2] http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8845
[3] "SCRs [Security Council Resolutions] are not legislation, nor are they 'judgments' or 'quasi-judgments', nor are they treaties. Indeed they are for the most part very different from treaties. Many SCRs are not intended to have legal effects. Where they do have legal effects this is often only within the internal legal order of the United Nations." The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions, Michael C. Wood, page 79. http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf2/mpunyb_wood_2.pdf
[4] See link for text in Farsi: http://www.isna.ir/fa/news/94042915462/%D9%85%D9%85%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B9%DB%8C%
[5] See Endnote 4.
[6] See link for text in Farsi: http://farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13940518001037
[7] The Iranian perception that violations of Security Council resolutions do not have consequences may also apply to the JCPOA in its entirety, which was endorsed as a Security Council resolution at Iran’s insistence. This perception, and the possible intent to violate UNSCR 2231, might have been the reason for this insistence.
[8] "All States may participate in and permit the activities described below provided that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to permit such activity: (a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in S/2015/546 and of any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; and (b) the provision to Iran of any technology or technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, or Iran’s acquisition of an interest in any commercial activity in another State, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in subparagraph a of this paragraph or related to the activities described in paragraph 3. provided that in the event of an approval by the Security Council: (a) the contract for delivery of such items or assistance include appropriate end-user guarantees; and (b) Iran commit not to use such items for development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. This paragraph shall apply until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier." UNSCR 2231, Annex B, Paragraph 4. See Endnote 1 for link to text.
[9] See Endnote 8.
[10] "With the purpose of establishing a procurement channel, the Joint Commission will, except as otherwise provided by the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA, review and decide on proposals by states seeking to engage in: 7. the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, and, if the end-use will be for Iran's nuclear programme set out in this JCPOA or other non-nuclear civilian end-use, all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council), as well as any further items if the relevant State determines that they could contribute to activities inconsistent with the JCPOA…" JCPOA, Annex IV, Article 6, Paragraphs 6-7. See link for full text: http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/1651/
[11] UNSCR 2231, Annex B, Paragraph 5. See Endnote 1 for link to text.
[12] UNSCR 2231, Annex B, Paragraph 3. See Endnote 1 for link to text.

News Bulletin Achieves Since 2006 Click Here to go to the LCCC Daily English/Arabic News Buletins Archieves Since 2006

News Bulletin Achieves Since 2006
Click Here to go to the LCCC Daily English/Arabic News Buletins Archieves Since 2006